



**United Nations Office  
for Disarmament Affairs**

**Briefing to the Security Council on the Implementation of Security Council  
Resolution 2118 (2013)**

**Izumi Nakamitsu  
High Representative for Disarmament Affairs**

As delivered



12 September 2025  
Security Council Chamber

Mr. President,

Distinguished Members of the Security Council,

I thank Council members for the opportunity to brief you once again on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic.

Since the last consideration of this matter by the Council, and consistent with established practice, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has been in regular contact with counterparts in the OPCW Technical Secretariat on activities related to resolution 2118. I also held a virtual meeting with his excellency Ambassador Ibrahim Olabi a few days ago.

Mr. President,

Since the Council's last meeting on this matter, the OPCW and the Syrian Arab Republic have continued to engage on how to address outstanding issues related to Syria's chemical weapons dossier. Given the significant challenges to overcome in these efforts, I welcome the remarkable progress that has been made since the Council's last meeting.

As previously reported, since 2014, the OPCW Technical Secretariat has not been able to confirm that the declaration submitted by the previous Syrian authorities was accurate and complete, because of the insufficient and

inaccurate information it contained. A total of 26 outstanding issues were reported, of which 19 remain unresolved. The OPCW Technical Secretariat has reported that the substance of these issues is of ‘serious concern’ as it involves large quantities of potentially undeclared or unverified chemical warfare agents and chemical munitions.

In this month’s report, the OPCW Technical Secretariat reported that in addition to the 26 declared chemical weapons-related sites, information made available to the OPCW suggests that there are more than 100 other sites that may have been involved in chemical-weapons related activities. As part of its work on this matter, the OPCW Technical Secretariat plans to visit all these locations, taking into account security and other relevant considerations.

Mr. President,

Since March 2025, there have been four deployments of OPCW teams to the Syrian Arab Republic to consult with relevant authorities and to visit declared and suspected chemical weapons sites – the first two, as previously reported, in March and April; and the most recent two in June and August. I am also encouraged to hear that further deployments are being prepared.

However, I note that the most recent deployment, in August, was initially scheduled for 20 to 28 July. I am informed that the OPCW was forced to postpone this deployment as a result of air strikes carried out by Israel on 16 July, targeting several sites in Damascus, including a building in which the

OPCW teams had held several consultations with relevant Syrian authorities and that was located in the direct vicinity of the hotel used by the OPCW teams during its missions in Syria.

Mr. President,

I have been further informed that during the deployment that took place in April, the OPCW collected three samples at one of the visited locations. The OPCW has reported that the analysis of these samples conducted by OPCW designated laboratories revealed indicators of nerve agents. This is a concerning finding, and the OPCW has shared the results with the Syrian authorities and intends to address the issue in subsequent deployments.

Mr. President,

As has been previously reported, there are significant challenges ahead, and consistent support from the entire international community will be critical for efforts to rid Syria of all chemical weapons. The OPCW Director-General has noted that the tasks ahead will likely be more complex than those carried out 11 years ago with the destruction of Syria's declared chemical weapons programme.

I have been informed that the OPCW Technical Secretariat has been supporting and advising the Syrian Arab Republic, and other States Parties, with regard to the plans for destruction of any identified chemical weapons and related

remnants. The OPCW Technical Secretariat issued a Note on 24 July, which outlines the context for such destruction and also addresses the exceptional circumstances or conditions that may justify expedited in situ destruction and verification processes.

Mr. President,

The OPCW Technical Secretariat remains committed to delivering on its mandate to verify the full implementation by the Syrian Arab Republic of all declaration requirements under the Chemical Weapons Convention, decisions by OPCW policy-making organs, and of course, Security Council resolutions.

I would also reiterate that the commitment of the new authorities in Syria to fully and transparently cooperate with the OPCW Technical Secretariat is commendable.

Mr. President,

Distinguished Members of the Security Council,

As I have previously emphasized, there is currently a critical opportunity to obtain long-overdue clarifications on the full extent and scope of the Syrian chemical weapons programme and to rid the country of all chemical weapons.

I once again urge the members of this Council to unite and show leadership in providing the support that this unprecedented effort will require.

The United Nations stands ready to support and will continue to do our part to uphold the norm against the use of chemical weapons – anywhere, at any time.

I thank you very much for your attention.