



**Briefing to the Security Council on the Implementation of Security Council  
Resolution 2118 (2013)**

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Madame President,  
Distinguished Members of the Security Council,

I thank Council members for the opportunity to brief you once again on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic on behalf of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs.

Since the last consideration of this matter by the Council, and consistent with established practice, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has been in regular contact with counterparts in the OPCW Technical Secretariat on activities related to resolution 2118. In addition, I held a meeting last week with his excellency Ambassador Ibrahim Olabi, Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations.

Madame President,

Since the Council's last meeting on this matter, the OPCW and the Syrian Arab Republic have continued to engage on how to eliminate any remnants of the chemical weapons programme developed by the previous government.

As previously reported, since 2014, the OPCW Technical Secretariat has not been able to confirm that the declaration submitted by the previous government was accurate and complete, because of the insufficient and inaccurate information it contained. The OPCW Technical Secretariat reported 'serious concern' over the declaration's issues as it involved large quantities of potentially undeclared or unverified chemical warfare agents and chemical munitions.

In this month's report, the OPCW Technical Secretariat reiterates that in addition to the 26 declared chemical weapons-related sites, information made available to the OPCW suggests that there are more than 100 other sites that may have been involved in the previous government's chemical-weapons related activities. As part of its work on this matter, the OPCW Technical Secretariat plans to visit all these locations, taking into account security and other relevant considerations.

The new Government of Syria has been working with the OPCW Technical Secretariat to obtain clarifications on the full extent and scope of the programme developed by the previous Government and ensure Syria's long-term compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. Given the significant challenges to overcome in these efforts, I welcome the continued progress that has been made since the Council's last meeting.

Madame President,

Since March 2025, more than twenty locations have been visited. The OPCW has also conducted interviews with former chemical weapons experts, collected 19 samples, and over 6,000 documents from the visited locations. The Syrian Government handed over 34 sealed cardboard boxes containing documents to the OPCW Technical Secretariat, which have been documented and scanned, and will be processed for translation and analysis.

During the reporting period, the OPCW Technical Secretariat has also continued consultations with the Syrian authorities on the implementation of expedited on-site destruction in exceptional cases, as provided for in decision EC-110/DEC.1.

Madame President,

Based on the information gathered through the OPCW's deployments in 2025, at least two locations visited by the OPCW could be declarable under the CWC. The OPCW is planning further activities to determine the full scope of chemical weapons-related activities conducted at these two facilities and their subsequent declarability.

Unfortunately, I understand from counterparts at the OPCW Technical Secretariat that further visits are currently on hold, given the conflict in the region. However, the OPCW teams continue to conduct interviews and review documents until the security situation becomes more permissive.

Madame President,

As noted in the report, from 27 to 29 January 2026, the OPCW Technical Secretariat and the Syrian National Authority visited a location in the Aleppo area to assess potentially undeclared elements of the chemical weapons programme developed by the previous government, including "storage containers for chemical precursors, and 75 undeclared cylinders."

Upon arrival at the location, the OPCW Technical Secretariat observed over a dozen large volume containers, from which the OPCW team collected eight samples for further analysis. The cylinders were no longer present at the site, but on 28 January, the Syrian National Authority identified that they had been removed and reportedly destroyed at a local scrapyard. On 29 January, the OPCW team visited the scrapyard and observed pieces that may have been part of the gas cylinders.

Madame President,

The significant challenges ahead have been repeatedly emphasized in this Council, and the details shared about this visit further underline some of these challenges. I welcome the continued cooperation by the Syrian National Authority with the OPCW Technical Secretariat, which is essential to these efforts.

However, significant and consistent support from the international community is also needed to complete the extraordinary efforts to rid Syria of all chemical weapons.

I also take this opportunity to reiterate the United Nations' support for the integrity, professionalism, impartiality, objectivity, and independence of the work of the OPCW.

Madame President,

Distinguished Members of the Security Council,

As I have previously emphasized, this is a critical opportunity for the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. I once again urge the members of this Council to unite and show leadership in providing the support that this unprecedented effort will require.

The United Nations stands ready to support and will continue to do our part to uphold the norm against the use of chemical weapons – anywhere, at any time. I thank you very much for your attention.